Is Anything Artificial in Naturalism?
Graham Oppy says naturalism wins as the best explanation for nature, but it cannot explain artifacts or nature if nature is the cause of everything.
I’m following the Method of Engagement: 1) Present the topic. 2) State the atheist (naturalist) view. 3) State the theist view. 4) Analyze and compare. 5) Ask for feedback.
1. Present the topic.
Is anything artificial in naturalism? This question might seem like a quibble, but I think it is a serious matter to understand what we mean when we say “nature.” Naturalism is one of the different beliefs within atheism. Philosophical naturalism is the view that everything is natural. A naturalist believes that only laws and forces of nature operate in the world. All beings, all events, and all causes belong to the natural universe. This view rules out supernatural beings, events, or causes. As such, all knowledge can be pursued by the scientific investigation of nature, and all nature is potentially knowable.
The words “artifact” and “artificial” come from the classical Latin, artificiālis, which means made by human skill and ingenuity (OED). An “artifact” (n) is an object made by human workmanship as opposed to natural processes. Something “artificial” (adjective) is made by skill that imitates or is a substitute for something which is made of occurs naturally. Artifacts and artificial things are man-made. These words seem to be at odds with naturalism.
The fact we have the term “artificial” in our language is evidence that we know either atheistic naturalism is false because it cannot explain all beings, events, and causes or that human ingenuity is a deception. Both cannot be true.
2. State the atheist/naturalist view.
Another reason to examine naturalism is because Graham Oppy, in his book The Best Argument Against God, concludes that naturalism wins as the most theoretically virtuous big picture for atheism. “Naturalism,” he says, “entails atheism” (6). If there is no supernatural realm, there can be no God. The reverse is not true. Atheism does not entail naturalism because some atheists believe in non-natural beings (ghosts, fairies) as long as they are not gods.
In this book, he more fully lays out the argument that he summarizes in his later book, Atheism: The Basics. To review of Oppy’s method, he examines two belief sets: the atheistic big picture and the theistic big picture (Basics, section 6.1). He says that both big pictures take the same sensory input and lived experience data and process it according to different worldviews. He attempts to refine both belief sets so as to compare the best and most minimal big picture arguments that survive consistency and explanatory sufficiency. This allows him to then identify the system that is most theoretically virtuous (Basics, section 6.4). Theoretical virtue is determined by a balance of a) minimization of theoretical commitments and b) maximization of explanatory depth and breadth. He finds that naturalism wins over theism because, although both big pictures align in how well they explain nature, theism entails the additional metaphysical commitment of belief in God.
In comparing the merits of theism and naturalism, Oppy brings up William Paley’s (1743 – 1805) watchmaker version of the design argument for the existence of God (Best Argument, 33-34). Just as a watch has parts that are organized for a purpose by an intelligent human designer, so too, says Paley, does nature. Paley offers detailed descriptions of biological complexity to prove intelligent design and names God as the supreme designer (Paley, 9-19). His purpose is also to prove atheism absurd, and on first consideration his watchmaker analogy appears compelling. If we are amazed at the skill of a watchmaker by admiring the workings of the device, how much more so, he asks, should living things who reproduce themselves “increase beyond measure our admiration of the skill which had been employed in the formation of such a machine?”
Oppy, however, thinks Paley’s attempt to prove God exists fails and, even if it were successful, would still not provide a reason to prefer theism to naturalism. He cites the discovery of the Antikythera mechanism, an artefact found in an ancient shipwreck off the coast of the Greek island Antikythera in 1901, as an example to demonstrate why Paley’s argument fails. The device is thought to be a model of the Solar System and is recognized as the oldest known example of an analogue computer. It was used to predict astronomical positions.
Oppy points out that the discoverers of this device knew immediately that it was not caused by nature. Why? Because it is obviously made of non-natural materials and has a non-natural form. Oppy says:
These points are utterly destructive of Paley’s argument. When we observe plants and animals, we do NOT find them to be composed of metals that are not found in nature. When we observe plants and animals, we do NOT find them to have shapes that do not belong to the natural world. When we open up plants and animals, we do NOT find that they contain cog-wheels. Etc. In other words, it is simply false that ‘every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature’ (Best Argument, 33).
Because we can easily discern that the watch is a man-made artifact, all the argument proves, according to Oppy, is that we can recognize “artifacts” as obvious. It does not prove that God makes artifacts so that we can know God exists. Additionally, he says, there is a natural explanation for design in nature. Evolutionary theory can explain the presence of the complexity of living systems, living things, and the organization of organs, tissues, and cells. Evolution does not produce things like the Antikythera mechanism.
As you may have guessed, I am perplexed that while defending naturalism as the best big picture, Oppy rejects a theist argument on the basis of recognizing artifacts as something obviously not caused by nature.
3. State the theist view.
I could address the Trinitarian view of the human person as made in the image and likeness of God, but instead I want to stick with Paley’s argument. I would not agree with Oppy that the Watch argument should make it into the refined set of theist arguments because it is fundamentally flawed.
To back up a bit, the Thomistic view builds on Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Unlike modern naturalism, Aristotle starts his Physics acknowledging that there are two main categories of causes. “Of things that are, some are by nature, others through other causes…not put together by nature” (II.1.192b8-30). He distinguishes nature as a cause and artifacts as those things “not put together by nature” but by humans. Why the difference? Things put together by nature have in themselves a source of motion and growth, an “innate impulse of change” (II.1.192b30). Things put together by humans do not. In other words, a watch or an Antikythera mechanism have never been observed to grow, reproduce, or heal themselves as living things do, nor do they appear in nature in any form. This is the same point Oppy makes: artificial things are not found in nature. For Aristotle, artifacts are assembled by external human movers.
Aristotle maintains that to know a thing is to know its cause, and he famously identifies four causes: material, efficient, formal, and final (II.3.194b22-195a5). The final cause for a watch is to keep time. The efficient cause, the watchmaker, imposes the formal cause, the gears and such, on the material cause, metal alloys. The human designer conceives of the device in his intellect before he makes the watch, so the final cause comes first and directs everything else. The concept of teleology and intelligent design is easy to grasp for man-made objects.
Aristotle names no intelligent designer of nature. He takes nature itself as the principle of motion. By the end of Physics, Aristotle crosses into metaphysics by deducing the existence of an Unmoved First Mover as the necessary eternal being and cause of all motion and change (VIII.5.256a12-21; 6.258b1-10). Aristotle views the universe as whole, so to discover the final cause of anything, for him, is to discover its place in nature. I find it interesting that Aristotle does not name the Unmoved First Mover as the principle of teleology and final cause since, for him, nature suffices for directing things to their ends.
Aquinas goes further. With the benefit of divine revelation, he concludes in his Fifth Way that God is the designer, the Creator, who directs all things to their end (ST.I.2.3).* Edward Feser explains a subtle but critical distinction in a scholastic essay on Aquinas’s Fifth Way. Aristotle regards God as the “cause of things’ moving in such a way that they realize their ends,” while Aquinas regards God as the “cause of things having those ends in the first place” (Feser, 148-149, 158). Aquinas asserts the Christian theology of creation. Now let’s put it all together.
4. Analyze and compare.
I’ll take this in parts: a) Why Paley’s argument does not work; b) Why atheistic naturalism does not work; and c) Why I disagree with Oppy.
a) Why Paley’s argument does not work
The relevant point here is that both natural and artificial things are oriented toward an end, but the source of final causality differs. Artificial things are designed by human intelligence extrinsically when the form in the human’s intellect is imposed on the natural materials that would otherwise not so organize without human intervention. Think: science and technology. Natural things, according to Aristotle, have design intrinsically from nature. So too for Aquinas, but for him nature is God’s creation. The serious consequences of Paley’s Watch argument now become clear. Paley’s argument assumes nature is art by anthropomorphizing God as an extrinsic designer. With no grasp of intrinsic design, nature seems mechanical and inert rather than whole and purposeful.
Intelligent Design (ID) theorists today follow Paley’s path, and I have been critical of ID theory in the past.* (See my discussion with Michael Behe on Pat Flynn’s podcast, Two Catholic Scientists Debate Intelligent Design.) Theologically, if God is Creator, then we do not think of God as wandering around the universe until he trips over some nature stuff and then decides to assemble it into the world. God creates nature. God creates us. We design artifacts using natural materials.
b) Why atheistic naturalism does not work
Where Paley’s Watch argument casts everything as artifact, Oppy’s naturalism casts everything as nature. The former is meant to prove God exists; the latter to argue that there is no need to posit gods. (Horseshoe theory?)
If nature is the only cause, if everything is natural, if only laws and forces of nature operate in the world, if all beings, all events, and all causes belong to the natural universe, then a watch, Antikythera mechanism, or any other “artifact” is the natural product of the human, who himself is a product of nature alone. Even if naturalism allows for the mind or consciousness to arise from the brain, the production of technology is still the production of nature. The words “artifact” or “artificial” or “art” have no real meaning in strict, atheistic naturalism.
To the extent that words convey ideas in our minds, the fact that the English language has a word that is an antonym for natural suggests that we know instinctively there is something other than natural, and we know there is something about human nature that is beyond nature. Theism accommodates these ideas. Atheistic naturalism has no place for such words or ideas. For this reason, naturalism does not explain more than theism. It doesn’t even explain why nature exists. It does not explain naturalism itself.
Rejecting the Aristotelian-Thomistic ideas of nature and art has consequences for how we live. Under atheistic naturalism, artificial flavorings are the same as natural flavorings. Egyptian pyramids are caused by nature. Mobile phones arise by the same ultimate causes as dandelions. Artificial intelligence is just natural intelligence. Every work of art in the Louvre…is nature. Any damage done to the environment by technology? That’s just nature so stop blaming humans. Nature is the only cause.
c) Why I disagree with Oppy
These distinctions between art and nature fit my worldview and big picture. What is in nature is natural. What is man-made is artificial. Human ingenuity is a real power we possess, and as such, it comes with responsibilities towards other humans and the rest of nature. There is something about us that is spiritual and transcends nature. I am not merely the bumbling around of particles doing the next thing the laws of nature dictate that I do. I don’t want to put on blinders and refuse to do what Aristotle was willing to do so long ago.
As someone who lives the theist big picture and has thought about various arguments, both atheistic and theistic, I’m deeply satisfied with how science, philosophy, and theology fit together in the Thomistic, Catholic view. The reason humans can produce artifacts, artificial things, and art is because we are body and rational soul composites, made in the image and likeness of God, and can, therefore, conceive of forms in our intellects to design using natural materials. The production can be works of beauty and creative function.
This is what the scientist does. She studies nature, learns its mysteries and laws, and then manipulates matter and energy to innovate. I follow technology and scientific progress because it is exciting to see what humans can do. When I study nature, I study creation with awe and wonder. As a chemist I am privileged to know more about creation at the atomic realm than I would otherwise. When I teach chemistry, I guide others into that realm. As a citizen, I realize this also obligates me to stewardship of the very creation I am grateful for. I’m grateful for my existence. I’m a most thorough naturalist, but only because I am more.
5. Thoughts?
It’s your turn. Am I making a big deal out of what you might call a quibble? Is there a way around this dilemma for atheists, agnostics, naturalists? Did I characterize Oppy’s view incorrectly? Do you agree he should not use Paley’s Watch argument as part of the theistic best big picture? Or do you agree with Paley and therefore with modern Intelligent Design theorists?* I think my most important question is: Where does this conversation go next? If “artificial” is a problem for naturalism, how has that been dealt with by others? I’m sure I’m not the first to ask, but I was unable to find much in the literature.
*This is a topic of its own for later.
Sources
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, The Aquinas Institute.
Aristotle, Physics: A Guided Study, trans. Joe Sachs (London: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 24, 49, 53, 199, 204.
Edward Feser, “Between Aristotle and William Paley: Aquinas’s Fifth Way,” in Neo-Scholastic Essays (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2015).
Graham Oppy, Atheism: The Basics (New York: Routledge, 2018).
Graham Oppy, The Best Argument Against God (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
Oxford English Dictionary
“naturalism (n.), sense 2,” Jul 2023, doi: 10.1093/OED/1717217432.
“artifact (n.), sense 1.a,” Jul 2023, doi: 10.1093/OED/4780266080.
“artificial (adj.), sense I.1.a,” Nov 2023, doi: 10.1093/OED/7870411410.
William Paley, Natural Theology, (New York: American Tract Society, 1802).
I think it may be helpful to reconstruct the dialectic between Oppy and Paley to provide some clarity on his objections. Essentially, what Paley (and his contemporary defenders) wants to do is examine the relationship of features that are products of intelligent design within the universe and then make an analogy to try to show that the same reasons that allow us to see that objects within the universe are products of intelligent design, also can carry over when evaluating the universe itself as a whole. Paley wants to say that objects within the universe that have been designed exhibit a certain property (let's call this property X) and that since the universe exhibits the same property, we can say the universe is designed.
Oppy, of course, wants to challenge this reasoning. The first question to ask is regarding the principle source of the inference that we have that the watch is designed; as Oppy puts it, "What is it about watches that makes it 'inevitable' that they should have this effect upon us?" (pg. 32). The answer that Paley gives has to do with the *function* of the watch, as Oppy notes:
"Paley claims that, when we observe the watch, we see that it has a principal function, that its parts have functions, and that the materials from which the watch and its parts are constructed are well suited to the functions that those parts have. Moreover, Paley claims that it is because we see these things that we 'inevitably' form the view that the watch has a maker." (pg. 32)
For Paley, property X is considerations about function, namely that when inspecting objects that have been designed, it is the considerations about an object's function that allow us to discern whether the product is designed or not. However, Oppy contests this and believes there are other considerations at play. Here, I will quote from an earlier work of Oppy's "Arguing About Gods" where he engages in a much more detailed treatment of Paley's argument:
".... there is clearly room for questioning whether Paley has correctly identified the source of our confidence in the 'inference' that a given watch is the product of design. There are at least two difficulties here. On the one hand, it seems highly doubtful that it is considerations about 'function' that play the main role: there are other more immediate things that we see when we inspect the watch that will make the 'inference' to design inevitable. And, on the other hand, it seems highly doubtful that considerations about 'function' could be sufficient to underwrite the 'inference' to design." (pg. 176)
https://philpapers.org/rec/OPPAAG-2
Recall, the main question is, what is property X? Specifically, what is the source of the inference that allows us to see if an object was designed? Paley wants to say that property X is about function. Oppy objects to this in two different ways, by providing a rebutting defeater and an undercutting defeater.
A rebutting defeater offers evidence to show a specific thesis is false. It provides an alternative or more powerful conception of evidence that can rebut the thesis in question and challenge the conclusion.
An undercutting defeater offers reasons for skepticism about the premises or evidence used to support a particular conclusion. It doesn't directly say a specific thesis is false; instead, it provides us good reasons to think that a proponent of an argument has not provided sufficient evidence for the thesis they wish to defend.
Oppy employs both these strategies in his critique of the argument, specifically to show that property X is *not* about function.
Oppy offers an undercutting defeater to show that considerations about function are insufficient to support the inference to design through the discovery of the Antikythera mechanism. In this case, we don't know the function of the object. However, we can still infer design, which can serve as an undercutting defeater to Paley's argument that property is X is about function because we have an argument that challenges the evidence that Paley marshals. To quote Oppy:
"The discoverers of this mechanism immediately recognised that it was a man-made artefact, even though they had no idea about its principal function, nor about the sub-functions served by the parts, nor (consequently) whether the materials from which the mechanism and its parts were constructed were well suited to the functions in question." (pg. 32)
Oppy offers a rebutting defeater to show that the considerations about function don't play the leading role when it comes to the inference that something is designed by providing an alternative account, namely considerations about a thing's background knowledge having a more immediate role in allowing us to see whether an object is designed or not. As noted earlier, it has to do with considerations related to our background knowledge of the objects and materials in question:
"Well, they could see immediately that it was composed from metals that do not occur in nature – for example, bronze. They could see immediately that it has a shape that does not belong to the natural world. They could see immediately that there were cog-wheels in its interior – and, of course, they knew full well that cog-wheels do not grow on trees. Etc." (pg. 33)
Oppy elaborates on this in "Arguing About Gods":
"The compelling reasons that we have for supposing that the watch is the product of intelligent design simply do not carry over to reasons for supposing that the natural world is the product of intelligent design. The background knowledge that we have about the production of manufactured materials and components is not paralleled by any comparable knowledge about the production of biological materials and components." (pg. 177)
Both of these objections offer some decisive reasons for thinking that Paley's argument doesn't go through. While they may seem contradictory on the surface, when we understand the dialectical context and the nature of the objections being offered, it is much easier to see how they can serve as powerful rebuttals to the argument. Oppy challenges the evidence that Paley supports in consideration for his inference to design but also provides an alternative conception of the inference that isn't based on function.
With this clarity in mind, I think when you summarize Oppy's objections as follows:
"Because we can easily discern that the watch is a man-made artifact, all the argument proves, according to Oppy, is that we can recognize "artifacts" as obvious. It does not prove that God makes artifacts so that we can know God exists. Additionally, he says, there is a natural explanation for design in nature. Evolutionary theory can explain the presence of the complexity of living systems, living things, and the organization of organs, tissues, and cells. Evolution does not produce things like the Antikythera mechanism."
I would point out that it doesn't have to do with recognizing artifacts simpliciter, but rather more so because of our background knowledge of the materials and entities in question, which I think can address some of your points about artifacts on Naturalism.
I think most atheists would be happy to admit that human artifacts are "natural" in the broadest possible sense you're describing here - human agents are still the result of natural processes, and I personally see it as a good thing that naturalism weakens any intrinsic division you might make between them. We *shouldn't* think of the things we produce as entirely different from the things bees produce, or even the things plants or glaciers produce. But it still seems as though we can make meaningful distinctions between agential causes and non-agential causes in the meantime. As an atheist, I would just say an artifact is (roughly) anything produced by the intentional effort of a rational agent. The fact the the rational agent is themselves a product of an irrational natural process doesn't seem to cause any particular issue metaphysically. As an analogy, I might say that a particular compound is anything produced by a particular chemical reaction - the fact that the elements involved in that reaction are not themselves the product of the same chemical reaction isn't an issue, right?